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INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, the stock markets soared. Spurred by extremely favorable
recommendations from the premier securities analysts,' both the Nasdaq Composite
and the Dow Jones Industrial Averages reached record highs.2 As the market
quickly rose, so too did the collective status of securities analysts. Analysts such as
Mary Meeker, Henry Blodget, and Jack Grubman rose to the status of celebrity or,
* J.D. Candidate, 2004 Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 2001,
Purdue University. I am grateful to Dave Giampetroni and Chris Gibbs for their dedicated
efforts to previous revisions of this Note. I am also grateful to Professor William Hicks for
sparking my interest in securities issues and his tireless efforts in teaching the Seminar from
which this Note was generated. Also, I would like to thank Professors Charles Geyh and
Sarah Jane Hughes for their invaluable assistance in my law school endeavors. Finally, I
would like to thank my family, Mom and Amy, for their constant love and support. I know
without them, none of this would be possible.
1. Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1041 (2003). There are three different types
of analysts. First, sell-side analysts are the employees of brokerage firms who produce
research material for their investment clients and other institutional investors and whose
reports are usually published to the public; in addition to investment clients, these brokerage
firms make a substantial amount of their profits through investment banking. Id. Second,
buy-side analysts work for institutional investors and their reports are not made public. Id. at
1041 n.18. Finally, the independent analysts provide research to their customers, both
institutional and individual, but do not have a relationship with underwriting, investment
banking, or the companies they cover. Id. This Note will focus on the sell-side analysts and
the independent analysts.
2. E.S. Browning, Nasdaq Raises the Bar Again, to 4784.08, as Tech Stocks Keep
Things Jumping, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2000, at C1.
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as one article describes, rock stardom.3 However, with the bankruptcy of Enron,
WorldCom, and other highly visible companies, coupled with the bursting of the
Internet stock bubble, it became clear that many stocks were obscenely
overvalued.4 Hindsight has revealed that, rather than rock stars, analysts more
closely resembled magical illusionists who, through sleight of hand and deception,
persuaded their audience (i.e., investors) to believe in one thing, while knowing the
opposite to be true.
Generally, market analysts have been perceived as serving a beneficial role in
the United States capital markets. Both courts and academics have described the
role of analysts as the "ferret[ing] out" of information in order to help investors
make more informed decisions. To fulfill this role, analysts collect information
from various sources, including press releases and financial statements, analyze
that information, and then make recommendations to investors based on that
analysis.6 Conventional wisdom holds that when investors have more information
the market is more efficient. 7 Due to this information-gathering role, market
analysts are seen as integral to a properly functioning capital market. Because of
recent scandals involving some of the most illustrious investment firms, the
perceived role of analysts is being questioned.
This recent scandal garnered public interest through an investigation of high
profile securities analysts initiated by New York's Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer.8
This investigation revealed that analysts were publicly touting stocks to investors
as sound investments, but were disparaging these same stocks privately.9 An
illustration of this behavior is set forth in a complaint filed by Mr. Spitzer against
Bernie Ebbers, Chief Executive Officer of WorldCom, and others.' 0 Among other
allegations in this complaint, Mr. Spitzer discussed the research reports of Jack
Grubman, a telecommunications analyst for Solomon Smith Barney." In this
capacity, Mr. Grubman was charged with reporting on Focal Communications.
2
On February 21, 2001, Mr. Grubman placed a "buy" rating on Focal's stock while
it was trading at $15.50 per share.' 3 When Focal complained about its ratings
report, Mr. Grubman sent the following e-mail to two other Solomon Smith Barney
employees: "If I so much as hear one more ... peep out of them... we will put the
proper rating ([i.e.,] 4 not even 3) on this stock which every single smart buysider.
feels is going to zero."' 4 Despite Mr. Grubman's belief that Focal was overrated
3. Raymond L. Moss et al., The Wall Street Analyst: Rise and Fall of a Rock Star, in 2
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS 99, 99 (2002).
4. Id. at 101.
5. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
6. Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (1990).
7. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17.
8. Charles Gasparino, Ex-Analyst Blodget is Barred by NASD, Will Pay $4 Million,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2003, at Cl.
9. Id.
10. Complaint filed by Attorney General of New York, New York v. Anschutz, at
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep30;_02_complaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Complaint].
11. Id. at 13-21.
12. Id. at 17-18.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
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and "going to zero," he continued his "buy" recommendation even as the stock
plummeted from $15 to $1.24 per share. 15 While the investigation by the New York
Attorney General focused primarily on high profile analysts, Enron's story is more
illustrative of the sell-side analysts' collective behavior. By now, the story of
Enron's astronomical rise and its catastrophic fall into bankruptcy is well-known.'
6
Less well-known is the way analysts treated Enron's stock. Enron was treated as
one of the rising stars of the late 1990s and early 2000s. From a mere $19 per share
in 1997, the stock price rose to a hiih of around $90 in 2001 as analysts strongly
recommended the stock's purchase.' However, things were not as solid as Enron,
or the analysts, portrayed them. 18 On October 16, 2001, Enron published a press
release stating that it was taking a nonrecurring charge of over one billion dollars. 19
This was quickly followed by an October 22 press release stating that the SEC had
decided to investigate Enron's dealings. 20 Even after these releases, sixteen out of
seventeen analysts who covered Enron continued to tout Enron as a "buy" or
"strong buy.'21 Less than two months later, Enron declared bankruptcy. 22
While sell-side analysts consistently missed the mark with Enron, the track
record of independent analysts was much more impressive. Of the eight
independent analysts who covered Enron, six were encouraging their clients to sell
long before sell-side analysts.23 One of these independent research firms, Off Wall
Street Consulting Group, Inc. ("Off Wall Street"), reported as early as May 6,
2001, that Enron's $60 share price was overvalued by over one-half.24 Surprisingly,
Off Wall Street cited the use of related-party transactions and declining profit
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Duane Windsor, Business Ethics at "The Crooked E", in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 659, 663 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala
G. Dharan eds., 2004).
17. Id. at 666.
18. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulations, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 135 (2002).
19. Press Release, Enron, Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of $0.43
Per Diluted Share; Reports Non-Recurring Charges of $1.01 Billion After-Tax; Reaffirms
Recurring Earnings Estimate of $1.80 for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002; and Expands Financial
Reporting (Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with author). A nonrecurring charge is defined as a
"[olne-time income or expense entr[y] on the income statement of a corporation .... For
example, the... write-off of a loss." Allan H. Pessin & Joseph A. Ross, WORDS OF WALL
STREET: 2000 INVESTMENT TERMS DEFINED 152 (1983). In the case of Enron, the
nonrecurring charges were for "various bad investments and early termination of
arrangements 'with a previously discussed entity'--the latter in fact being entities controlled
by [Enron's] CFO [Andrew] Fastow, called LJM." Windsor, supra note 16, at 668.
20. Press Release, Enron, Enron Announces SEC Request, Pledges Cooperation (Oct.
22, 2001) (on file with author).
21. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57
Bus. LAW. 1403, 1407 (2002).
22. Press Release, Enron, Enron Files Voluntary Petitions for Chapter 11
Reorganization; Sues Dynegy for Breach of Contract, Seeking Damages of at Least $10
Billion (Dec. 2, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that Enron filed for Chapter 11 on Dec.
2, 2001).
23. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., REPORT ON
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, at 59




margins as the reason for their sell recommendation. 25 Both of these factors,
especially related-party transactions, played a significant role in Enron's
unraveling.
26
This Note explores why sell-side analysts missed what independent analysts
caught. Part I focuses on factors that may have influenced sell-side analysts,
including the lack of deterrence and the presence of conflicts of interest. This Part
suggests that while these two factors played a significant role, another factor that
led to the failure of sell-side analysts was their lack of incentive to accurately value
stock. In Part H, the focus shifts to recent regulations that have been adopted to
cure the perceived problems regarding analyst recommendations. This Part also
evaluates the effectiveness of these regulations in preventing further analyst
transgressions. Finally, Part IIl argues that while the current regulations may be
sufficient to cure some of the ills of sell-side research, they do not cure them all. If
the problem is lack of incentive to correctly price securities, as this Note suggests,
then the regulations fail to prevent future inaccurate recommendations because they
do not provide sell-side analysts with sufficient incentives to properly value
securities. This Note theorizes that due to the lack of incentive to properly value
securities, the only true way to protect investors is by a complete separation of
research from investment banking.
I. WHAT CAUSED SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS TO Miss ENRON?
In the wake of Enron's collapse, Congress commenced hearings before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs to explore the role of sell-side analysts in
Enron's collapse and the resultant loss by investors. 27 The committee's purpose
was to determine why the analysts were "blinded to the company's deceit and
disintegration. 28 Senator Joseph Lieberman, the committee chairman, framed the
issue in his opening statement by asking why "private analysts whose warnings
could have, and many say should have, alerted investors to the fiscal fissures in
Enron's foundation before everything crumbled . . . instead continued to urge
investors to buy Enron stock even after the company began to crumble."29 Indeed,
many analysts and academics believe red flags existed that should have tipped
analysts to the unstable foundation upon which Enron sat.
30
Despite these red flags, the sell-side analysts taking part in the congressional
hearing were quick to place blame on Enron and its deceptive use of partnerships to
hide losses and other debts.31 On the other hand, Howard Schilit, an independent
25. Id.
26. Windsor, supra note 16, at 679.
27. The Watchdogs Didn't Bark: Enron and the Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Watchdogs
Didn't Bark].
28. Id. at 1 (statement of Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufiins, Red Flags in Enron 's Reporting of
Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPUCATIONS, supra note 16, at 97.
31. See, e.g., Watchdogs Didn't Bark, supra note 27, at 27 (statement of Curt N.
Launer, Managing Director, Global Utilities Research Group, Credit Suisse First Boston).
1040 [Vol.79:1037
SECURITIES ANALYSIS
analyst (and founder and president of the Center for Financial Research and
Analysis), believed that the problems at Enron should have been detected sooner.32
In his testimony before Congress, Mr. Schilit responded to the claims by the sell-
side analysts that they were defrauded like everyone else: "Everybody is saying
they hid from us, they lied to us, they committed a fraud .... I spent an hour of my
time last night going through every quarterly filing proxy . . . and I have three
pages of warnings, words like 'non-cash sales,' words like '$1 billion of related-
party revenue."'-3 If Mr. Schilit, in just an hour, could find warning signs, why did
sixteen out of seventeen sell-side analysts ignore them for months? This Part
discusses some possible answers to this question, including the lack of deterrence
in place for analysts who failed to accurately report and the various conflicts of
interest that may have clouded the judgment of analysts. Yet, while both lack of
deterrence and conflicts of interest played an important role, they do not
completely explain the failures of the securities analysts. In addition to these
problems, and indeed compounding them, analysts simply lacked any real incentive
to accurately value securities.
A. The Absence of Deterrence from Third Party Liability
One theory that is offered to explain why gatekeepers failed to fulfill their role
in the market is that there was not sufficient deterrence in place to keep them
honest.34 This theory argues that during the 1990s, the risk of third-party liability
under the Securities Act declined to such an extent that it no longer served to
inhibit fraudulent conduct. 35 In describing this theory, Professor John Coffee, Jr.
stated that "Economics 101 teaches us that when the costs go down, while the
benefits associated with any activity go up, the output of the activity will
• ,,36
increase. By giving investment-banking clients positive ratings, analysts37
encourage companies to keep their business with that firm. At the same time, by
giving buy ratings, the brokers encourage more investment by their clients, which
raises their profits as well.38 If the law does not supply enough deterrence, the
theory holds, analysts are more likely to take part in this questionable behavior to
increase profits.
Much evidence supports this theory. First, in 1995 Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). 39 The passage of this act created a
significant obstacle for any private cause of action for securities fraud. In passing
the PSLRA, one of Congress's central objectives was to protect third-party
32. Id. at 23, 40 (statement of Howard M. Schilit, President, Center for Financial
Research and Analysis, Inc.).
33.Id. at40.
34. Coffee, Jr., supra note 21, at 1409. Professor Coffee defines the term gatekeeper as
"reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors."
Id. at 1405. These gatekeepers include security analysts, lawyers, auditing firms, and credit
rating agencies. Id.
35. Id. at 1409.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1411.
38. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1045.
39. Coffee, Jr., supra note 21, at 1409.
2004]
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participants, including analysts.4° This is evident from the Congressional Record
which stated, "[u]nderwriters, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals are
prime targets of abusive securities lawsuits. The deeper the pocket, the greater the
likelihood that a marginal party will be named as a defendant in a securities class
action.",
4 1
To prevent abusive litigation, Congress increased the pleading requirements
beyond those normally required in fraud cases. The PSLRA requires that "with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter [plaintiff must] state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.943 If a plaintiff cannot meet this heightened
standard, the case must be dismissed. 4 One court found this section of the PSLRA
to be the "most significant modification" to fraud cases.45
Even if the hurdles of the PSLRA can be overcome, a plaintiff must still prove
fraud. The most common route to prove federal securities fraud is through § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. To prove fraud under these
sections, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: "(a) the defendant
made a false statement or omission of (b) a material fact (c) with scienter (d) upon
which the injured 4party justifiably relied and that proximately caused the injured
party's damages."4 Further, because a stock recommendation is a statement of the
analyst's opinion, the only claim that can be brought is that the analyst did not
actually hold that opinion.47 In addition to the scienter requirement, the plaintiff
must also prove that the statements or omissions were the proximate cause of the
loss. 48 Thus, the presence of intervening factors causing the loss, such as an overall
market decline, may allow the defendant to avoid liability.
49
In re Merrill Lynch & Co.50 demonstrates the difficulty facing plaintiffs who
sue analysts based on their reports. In that case, investors in two different Internet
companies, 24/7 and Interliant, brought suit against Merrill Lynch based on the
recommendations of Merrill Lynch's Internet analyst, Henry Blodget.5 1 They based
their suit on their purchase of stock, for which they relied on the published
40. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat. 737) 679, 688.
41. Id.
42. Coffee, Jr., supra note 21, at 1409.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). This heightened standard is in
contrast to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which merely requires intent to
be "averred generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
45. Queen Uno Ltd. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 (D.
Colo. 1998).
46. James J. Armstrong et al., Securities Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 973, 976 (1996)
(citing Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bruschi v. Brown, 876
F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1989))).
47. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090-98 (1991).
48. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available
at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/RulingsOflnterest.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 358-59.
1042 [Vol.79:1037
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recommendations of Merrill Lynch. 2 They alleged that the recommendations were
materially misleading because the "analysts misrepresented their true opinions in
the reports" and therefore violated § 10(b).53
In dismissing this case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the heightened pleading
standards of the PSLRA by failing to allege particular facts sufficient to show that
Mr. Blodget did not actually hold the opinion that he had expressed regarding the
particular stocks involved. The court further held that the bursting of the Internet
stock bubble was an intervening factor that caused the value of the stocks to drop.
55
According to the court, there was no link between Mr. Blodget's reports and the
Internet bubble bursting. 6 This case seems to be representative of the types of
cases that will be brought against analysts, and its conclusion reveals the struggle
facing plaintiffs in the future.
57
In addition to the problems described above, another line of cases has placed a
further limitation on plaintiff suits. In Lampf v. Gilbertson,5 8 the United States
Supreme Court significantly limited the statute of limitations for securities fraud.
This case held that the statute of limitations for fraud cases is limited to one year
from the time the plaintiff had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
claim; or in any event no more than three years.59 This leaves a very narrow
window for plaintiffs to bring claims against analysts.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Most of the blame for the failure of market analysts to accurately value stock
has been placed on their suspected conflicts of interest. 6° While several types of
conflicts have been suggested as causal, this Note focuses on two especially critical
ones. The first conflict is the perceived influence of investment banking business.
This is overwhelmingly considered the primary cause of analyst indiscretion. The
second conflict is the informational conflict. This conflict arises because analysts
often rely on the company itself for a large part of their information; thus, to
publicly disparage stocks, however justified the disparagement, is to risk losing this
important resource.61
52. Id. at 359. Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this case were not claiming to have any
contractual relationship with Merrill Lynch or Henry Blodget, in fact, they were not even
claiming to have read the reports. Id. Instead, the plaintiffs were relying on a theory of fraud-
on-the-market in which the plaintiffs relied on the recommendations when they made their
purchases and this reliance was the cause of their loss. Id.
53. Id. at 360.
54. Id. at 372.
55. Id. at 364-65.
56. Id. at 365.
57. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that eight separate cases should be dismissed under summary judgment against Merrill
Lynch and their Internet analyst, Henry Blodget), available at http://www.nasd.uscourts.gov
Icourtweb/pdfIDO2NYSC/O3-08769.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
58. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
59. Id. at 364.
60. See, e.g., Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1043; Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig, Does
Independent Research Translate Into Better Stock Picks?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at C1.
61. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1054-62.
20041 1043
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
1. Investment Banking Conflicts
As mentioned, sell-side analysts often work for brokerage houses that also do
62a substantial amount of investment banking business. 2 In the past, investment
firms were supposed to have a "Chinese Wall" separating the research side (i.e.,
analysts) and the investment banking side of the business. 63 However, this
"Chinese Wall," or ethical wall, was not mandated by law or regulation.64 As a
result, even if a firm had a "Wall" between the two divisions, it was there only to
prevent the flow of nonpublic information to analysts, which would put analysts at
risk of violating insider-trading laws.65 That is, the "Wall" was present to protect
the analysts, not the investors. In practice, many analysts ignored the "Wall" and
participated intimately in the investment banking business.66 Some went so far as to
accompany investment bankers on road shows 6 7 to help build a market for a
company's securities. 68 Companies, realizing the benefits that a positive
recommendation could bring, often sought out those investment firms that
employed the most recognized analysts.69
Analyst involvement in investment banking business often puts extreme
pressure on analysts to give positive recommendations. This pressure arises in two
ways. First, companies that are selling securities on the market strongly prefer a
positive valuation. A negative rating from an analyst can cause a company to lose
millions in the open market. Many companies realize this and seek out investment
brokers whose analysts' ratings can boost their stock price. 70 Alternatively, a
company may take their investment business elsewhere-or at least threaten to do
so-if analysts are not willing to improve their rating. Analysts' reluctance to
speak negatively about stocks is suggested by the fact that durinf 2001, "less than
two percent of all sell-side analyst recommendations were 'sell."'
An example of this conflict arose out of Enron's use of Merrill Lynch for its
investment banking business. In 1998 Enron was seeking a better rating from
Merrill Lynch's analyst.72 Rather than trying to persuade the analyst with income
statements, cash flows, or balance sheets, Enron simply threatened to take its
investment business elsewhere. 73 Following these threats, the analyst following
62. See supra note 1.
63. REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON, supra note 23, at 63.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1041.
67. A road show is defined as "a series of meetings throughout the country, and
frequently abroad, at which the company's management will make presentations to invited
groups of institutional investors, money managers, and securities salesmen." CHARLES J.
JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 150
(2d ed. 1997).
68. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1041; see also Complaint, supra note 10, 36, at 10-
11 (alleging that certain Solomon Smith Barney analysts were involved with road shows in
which a public market was established for those securities).
69. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1041.
70. Id.






Enron left Merrill Lynch and was replaced by an analyst who quickly changed the
rating, thereby preventing Enron from taking its investment business to another
firm. Perhaps not surprisingly, all of the sell-side analysts who were questioned
by Congress denied that the firm's investment banking business played a role in
their ratings.75
The second pressure on analysts was that, in many cases, a portion of analysts'
salaries and bonuses was based on investment banking business.7 6 For example,
Richard Gross of Lehman Brothers testified before Congress that at least 7?art of his
bonus was calculated based on the investment business of his firm.7 Another
example is Jack Grubman, who was rated by the SSB sales force as the worst SSB
analyst for 2000 and 2001 .78 Despite this distinction, Mr. Grubman claimed over
$166 million dollars in investment bank business, generating an average
compensation of around $20 million. 79
The idea that analyst recommendations are often clouded by the firm's
investment banking business is not new. In fact, the issue of investment banking
conflicts was being discussed before the bankruptcy of Enron. 80 On June 28, 2001,
the SEC issued an investor alert "urging investors not to rely solely on analyst
recommendations when deciding to buy... stock. Instead, investors should consult
multiple sources of information while considering their own investment goals and
tolerance for risk.' '8' The SEC alert stated that many market analysts are subject to
severe pressure from investment banking clients to give positive ratings.82
This is one of the most salient differences between sell-side and independent
analysts. Independent analysts are called independent largely because the
companies that employ them do not have investment banking business.8 3 Unlike
sell-side analysts, who work for companies whose primary income comes from
investment banking, independent analysts are free to write objectively about a
company's prospects without fear of reprisal.84 At the same time, because
74. Id.
75. REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON, supra note 23, at 65. While this is
important to note, it is questionable how valuable this information truly is. It is difficult to
believe that had these people truly biased their reports because of investment banking, they
would be willing to divulge that information on the public record to Congress. Further, it is
possible that the valuation based on conflicts of interest may have been more of a cognitive
or subconscious choice as opposed to an intentional attempt to defraud. See generally
Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Cognitive Biases in Market Forecasts, 27 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT. 72 (2000).
76. See Millon, supra note 71, at 315.
77. Watchdogs Didn't Bark, supra note 27, at 47 (When asked what his bonus was
dependent on, Gross responded: "Overall profitability of the firm, yes, and the investment
bank is part of our firm.").
78. Complaint, supra note 10.
79. Id.
80. Press Release, SEC, Investor Alert Provides Tips for Assessing Analyst
Recommendations and Decodes Commonly Used Disclosure (June 28, 2001), http:/l
www.sec.gov/news/press/2001-66.txt (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id.




investment banking business does not play a part in their salaries, they can more
freely and objectively rate stocks.
2. Informational Conflicts
The second type of conflict is what this Note calls informational conflicts of
interest. For many analysts, one of the greatest sources of information about a
company will come from the company itself.85 This can be done through
conference calls, analyst conferences, and personal telephone calls. 86 Increasingly,
87analysts have come to rely on this type of information. At the same time,
however, companies are reluctant to divulge information to analysts who will use it
to negatively evaluate the company's stock.88 Because of this reluctance, the
company may cut an analyst off from certain types of information-for example,
not inviting them to conferences or not returning telephone calls-for writing a
negative recommendation. 89 As Patricia Walters, Senior Vice-President of
Professional Standards and Advocacy at the Association for Investment
Management and Research ("AIMR"),90 has described the conflict: "If an analyst
knows a company may retaliate, that analyst can't do a good job, and will be
reticent about making the company mad."9 1
The discussion of this conflict of interest is rife with anecdotal evidence. One
of the clearest examples of agent blackballing is the case of Heather Jones, an
analyst at BB&T Capital Markets. 92 Ms. Jones's job included reporting on Fresh
Del Monte Produce Inc. ("Del Monte").93 Citing risk from litigation and weakness
in core business areas, Ms. Jones downgraded Del Monte's rating.94 Subsequently,
Ms. Jones asked a question during a conference call to which Mohammad Abu-
Ghazaleh, CEO of Del Monte, responded "Let me tell you Heather, one thing
please. You are covering us without our will and we would not like you to ask
questions on this conference call, if you may."95 When asked why she could not ask
questions, Abu-Ghazaleh responded, "You can cover us the way you want, but you
have not been covering us in an objective way and we thank you for being on this
call, but we don't like to answer your question." 96 With this type of response to a




89. Howard Stock, SEC Plan to Prevent Blackballing Falls Flat, INVESTOR REL. Bus.,
July 7, 2003, at 1.
90. The Association for Investment Management and Research is a nonprofit
organization of over 68,000 investment practitioners with the stated mission of "serv[ing] its
members and investors as a global leader in education and examining investment managers
and analysts and sustaining high standards of professional conduct." AIMR, AIMR
Description, available at http://www.aimr.com/support/about/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
91. Stock, supra note 89.
92. Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, Stock Analysis: 'You Don't Like Our Stock?
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negative rating, it is understandable that analysts may be reluctant to make a
negative recommendation and risk losing such a valuable resource.
3. Lack of Incentive
These two theories-lack of deterrence and conflicts of interest-help explain
why many sell-side analysts failed to catch the collapse of Enron, and why many
independent researchers caught the problems before Enron's bankruptcy. However,
it is the position of this Note that these two factors do not completely explain
analyst indiscretion. There are several reasons for this belief. First, it is true that
such measures as the heightened pleading standards and the curtailed statute of
limitations lessened the risk of liability, and therefore diminished an important
source of deterrence. 97 However, there were other potential sources of deterrence
that should have prevented this behavior.
Take, for example, the Global Settlement. The Global Settlement was based on
an enforcement action brought by the SEC against ten broker dealers for "failing to
ensure that the research they provided their customers was independent and
unbiased by investment banking interests." 98 In addition to the enforcement action
brought by the SEC, action was also brought by the NASD, the New York Stock
Exchange, and the New York Attorney General.99 The settlement of these
administrative proceedings resulted in $1.4 billion in penalties spread out among
the ten finms.1  In addition to monetary penalties, the Global Settlement also
placed procedural requirements on firms. 1o1 While there may have been substantial
protection from civil liability through the PSLRA and other rulings, the Global
Settlement clearly shows that there was still substantial risk in the form of
administrative punishment.
Second, another substantial deterrent should have been the risk of damaging
one's reputation in the profession.102 It was once believed that the risk of damaging
one's reputation was alone sufficient to prevent fraud. 103 The argument was that no
one client would be worth the damage to the analyst's reputation that would result
97. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 21.
98. Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst
Conflict of Interest (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/spch042803com.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Statement Regarding Global
Settlement].
99. Id.
100. Press Release, SEC, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004)
[hereinafter SEC Press Release]. The ten firms (and their monetary liability) that were the
targets of the Global Settlement are: Bear Stearns & Co. LLC ($80 million); Credit Suisse
First Boston Corp. ($200 million); Deutsche Bank ($80 million); Goldman Sachs ($110
million); J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. ($80 million); Lehman Brothers, Inc. ($80 million);
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. ($200 million); Morgan Stanley ($125 million); Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc. ($400 million); UBS Warburg LLC ($80 million). Id.
101. Id. These procedural requirements are discussed more fully in the following
section on regulations.
102. See Millon, supra note 71, at 315 (noting that analysts "who earned a reputation




from scandal. 1°4 While this theory has been called into question following Enron, 10 5
it is difficult to imagine that analysts such as Mary Meeker, Henry Blodget, or Jack
Grubman will ever be taken seriously as analysts again.
10 6
There is also evidence to suggest that the conflicts of interest alone could not
cause analyst failure. First, while the investment banking conflicts theory does a
solid job of explaining why firms that had substantial investment banking business
with a company were motivated to inflate ratings, it does not sufficiently explain
why the firms that had no investment banking business with a company were
motivated to rate those companies above their actual ratings. 1°7 This view was
shared by Anatol Feygin, the Senior Analyst and Vice-President at J.P. Morgan
Securities.'08 In his testimony before Congress, Mr. Feygin was asked whether
analysts have become more salespersons than analysts. 0 9 Mr. Feygin replied:
[H]ow much of an impact can I have as an analyst coming into a
herd and agreeing with the herd? I don't believe that that will give my
firm any leverage in any business and will in any way promote my
franchise. So I have to bring something different and something new
and something that will establish my credibility and value to the
investment community, the institutional investor, my clients.11
0
Earlier in his comments, Mr. Feygin stated that his firm did not have any
investment banking business with Enron."' While an analyst may be conflicted by
the reprisal that a negative rating might bring, an analyst with no investment
banking business would, theoretically, have a greater incentive to deviate from the
"herd." However, Mr. Feygin-like most other analysts-sustained a buy rating on
Enron long past the independent analysts even though he had no investment
banking income from Enron." 2 In fact, in spite of the incentive to separate from the
herd, only one of the sell-side analysts that covered Enron separated themselves." 
3
In addition, it does not appear that the threat of reprisal and denial of
information should have been sufficient to prevent analysts from properly
evaluating stocks. It is argued that companies are in no position to turn away large
numbers of analysts." 4 The relationship between analysts and companies is
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In fact, not only will these analysts never be taken seriously, but the SEC reached
settlements with Henry Blodget and Jack Grubman in which both received lifetime bans
from practicing as analysts. Statement Regarding Global Settlement, supra note 98.
107. Jaimee L. Campbell, Comment, Analyst Liability and the Internet Bubble: The
Morgan Stanley/Mary Meeker Cases, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 235, 241 (2001).
108. See Watchdogs Didn't Bark, supra note 27, at 15.
109. Id. at 46 (statement of Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 41 (stating that J.P. Morgan is "not involved in any equity underwriting
for Enron").
112. Id. at 25 (statement of Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs).
113. Coffee, Jr., supra note 21, at 1407-08.
114. Stock, supra note 89.
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symbiotic: each benefits from its relationship with the other.' 15 Because companies
"can only attract capital under a very bright spotlight," they rely on securities
analysts for publicity." 6 If a company were to limit analysts, they would also dim
the spotlight on the company.
This Note contends that there is a third factor that played a significant role in
sell-side analysts' failure to see what many independent analysts saw: a lack of
incentive for sell-side analysts to accurately evaluate stock value. The basis of this
theory is that sell-side analysts, unlike independent analysts, have little to gain by
their correct valuations, but instead have much more to gain by aggressively
pushing "buy" ratings on stock.
The shift in analyst incentives began in the mid-1970s. 17 It was during this
time that fixed trade commissions were eliminated." 8 Before this, firms could
collect seventy-five cents commission per share on transactions.19 However, the
end of fixed commissions created a race to the bottom.' 20 With new firms entering
the picture, commission rates quickly dropped from the previous seventy-five cents
per share to one-eighth cent per share." This dramatically cut into the profit
margins of investment firms, causing a shift in focus. In 1967, before the regulation
of fixed commissions, commissions generated around fifty-seven percent of Merrill
Lynch's revenues; investment banking produced just a small fraction of profits. 22
In 1997, commissions only accounted for sixteen percent of revenue while
investment banking profits had increased by a factor of fifty.123 Where once the
accuracy of research could generate revenue by bringing in a greater number of
clients, and thereby commissions, commissions today are such a small portion of a
company's revenue that it is unlikely that more accurate research will increase
profits of the company by any significant amount.
Today, many sell-side analysts make their ratings available to the public for
free.' 24 In fact, many investment firms see research not as income generating, but
instead as an expense to generate income from other sources. ' s Therefore, the
value of research does not come from its accuracy but from its ability to generate
revenue from other areas, such as investment banking or an increased number of
transactions. This may explain why only two percent of all analyst
recommendations during 2001 were sell recommendations. 26 The analysts' only
115. See id. (suggesting that blackballing analysts is the equivalent of "biting the hand
that feeds").
116. Id. (quoting Scott Wendall, CEO of Prospect Financial Advisors and former head
of investment banking at Solomon Brothers).
117. Andy Kessler, We're All Analysts Now, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at Al8.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. ("How did we come to this? Wall Street used to be such a cozy place-75-
cent-per share commissions .... But in the mid-1970's, the Big Bang hit, ending fixed
commissions.").
121. Id.
122. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1046.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., SmithBamey Access, Quotes, News and Research, at http://www.smith
bamey.com/port-hold/quote.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
125. ROBERT G. EccLEs & DWIGHT B. CRANE, DOING DEALS: INVESTMENT BANKS AT
WORK 173 (1988).
126. Millon, supra note 71, at 322; see also supra text accompanying note 71.
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incentive was to generate new income, either from the investment banking clients
or from increasing the number of transactions. A sell rating would not aid in
reaching either of these goals. Since there are more potential buyers of stock than
sellers of stock, if the incentive is to generate more income, then the catalyst of that
interest is to have a greater number of buy ratings than sell ratings. 127 It does not
matter whether ratings are accurate, only whether they generate revenue.
Even if all conflicts of interest are eliminated and deterrence is increased, sell-
side analysts still will have no incentive to accurately value stocks. Further, the
elimination of conflicts of interest may erode the incentive to research stocks
altogether. Deregulation of fixed commissions created an incentive void by
substantially decreasing the profitability of research. The investment banking
business filled that void; unfortunately, accuracy of research was not crucial to that
incentive. Eliminating conflicts of interest would eliminate the incentives created
by investment banking, but the lack of an incentive for accuracy would remain.
Moreover, even if the conflicts of interest are eliminated, other nefarious incentives
to value stock will emerge to replace it, or sell-side research will start to disappear.
There is evidence that the latter has already begun. Some of the largest broker-
dealers have drastically cut back on research, and some of them believe that sell-
side research will eventually cease altogether. 
128
Another intervening factor that exacerbated the decline in incentives to
accurately value stock was the rise of the stock market bubble.129 The stock bubble
created a "euphoria in which gatekeepers became temporarily irrelevant."' 30 It is
argued that the stock bubble presented a serious problem to analysts because it was
"dangerous to be sane in an insane world. The securities analyst who prudently
predicted reasonable growth and stock appreciation was quickly left in the dust by
the investment guru who prophecized a new investment paradigm . .,131 At the
same time, a "star" analyst could help a company generate more investment
banking business.1 32 Therefore, the incentives shifted from accurately reporting on
stocks to gaining a reputation as a "star" analyst. This was not done by
conservatively valuing stock based on revenue and profits; instead, it was achieved
by obtaining celebrity status. 
133
Tied very closely to this is the idea that analyst compensation was increasingly
based on investment banking business. 134 Since research is not in itself a revenue-
generating undertaking, the money had to come from investment banking. 35 This
gave the analysts a greater incentive to pursue investment deals forcing them to
spend less time following the companies to which they were assigned. 136 Because
127. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1045.
128. Emily Thornton et a., (Still) Pity the Poor Little Guy: Wall Street's Research Deal
Will Ease Egregious Conflicts, but Small Investors Remain Far from Protected, Bus. WK,
May 19, 2003, at 40, 40. In the two years prior to the April 28, 2003 global research
settlement, the number of covered companies dropped from 5500 to 4300. Id.
129. Coffee, Jr., supra note 21, at 1412-13.
130. Id. at 1412.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1412-13.
133. Id.





analysts were spending less time evaluating stocks, there was greater incentive to
follow the herd. 137 If an analyst does not have the time to correctly evaluate stocks
then it becomes relatively easier to simply issue the same rating as the other
analysts are giving to companies. It allows them to hide among the herd, rather than
drawing attention to themselves.
This lack of incentive may be the greatest difference between sell-side analysts
and independent analysts. Independent analysts generally make 100% of their
revenue from the accuracy of their recommendations. 138 Unlike sell-side analysts,
independent analysts generate no revenue from investment banking. 139 Some
independent analysts sell their recommendations and reports to institutional
investors such as mutual funds or individual cients. 14° If the quality of the research
does not meet the buyer's expectations then investors can take their business to
other analysts. Other independent analysts provide research to individuals in
exchange for making certain transactions such as buying and selling stock. 14'
Again, if they fail to provide accurate reports, clients can simply choose another
investment company.
Many institutional investors have seen this difference in incentives and have
chosen to use the research of independent analysts over that of sell-side analysts. 1
42
For example, Ed Halderman, the co-head of investing at Putnam, said "[sell-side
analysts'] importance to us has been declining. There will be shrinkage on Wall
Street in research."' 143 Another hedge fund manager said that he only pays for
researchers who "work to eat."'144 This highlights the greater incentive that
independent analysts have: if they fail to satisfy their clients with the accuracy of
research, they cannot fall back on investment banking to supplement their incomes.
II. CURRENT REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON ANALYST INCENTIVES
Congress and the SEC were quick to respond to the perceived problems of the
securities analyst. Through the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the NASD
and NYSE rules that followed, as well as Regulation Analyst Certification ("AC"),
both Congress and the SEC addressed the issue of analyst conflicts of interest. In
fact, the SEC was interested in analyst behavior even before the recent scandals
involving analysts. In 2000, the SEC passed Regulation Fair Disclosure ("FD") in
order to prevent the selective disclosure of information to analysts. 145 This Part
discusses these three attempts to regulate analyst behavior, along with a discussion
of each attempt's perceived effectiveness and effect on analyst incentives to
accurately value securities. This Part also discusses the Global Settlement, which,
137. See Millon, supra note 71, at 323.




142. Beth Healy, $1.4b Wall St. Settlement Finalized: Big Players Are Turning Away
from Stock Research Services, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2003, at Dl.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Robert J. Shiller, Outlaw Selective Disclosure?-Yes, Markets Must Be Fair,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at A18.
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while not a regulation that applies to all sell-side analysts, will play an important
role in policing analyst behavior.
A. Regulation FD
The SEC adopted Regulation FD in August of 2000,146 with the intention of
stopping companies from selectively disclosing information to analysts. 47 The goal
of this regulation is to level the playing field between analysts and individual
investors. 148 This goal is achieved by requiring companies to publicly disclose
material nonpublic information that it provides to analysts. 149 It is important to note
that Regulation FD regulates issuers of information and not analysts. 150 The
disclosure requirement of Regulation FD can be triggered in two different ways.
First, if the nonpublic information is intentionally conveyed to an analyst, then the
issuer must simultaneously disclose the information to the public.' 5' On the other
hand, if the information is disclosed unintentionally, then the issuer must disclose
the information to the public promptly. 52 Because information must be made
public, this regulation will help prevent the informational conflicts discussed
above. 153 Since issuers must make all material information public, issuers can no
longer selectively disclose material information to those analysts who give them
positive ratings and ignore the analysts who rate their company negatively; in
theory, every analyst should have equal access to information.
As noted, issuers must convey information publicly when it is material.' 54 The
SEC has yet to define "material information," but they have given examples,
including information relating to earnings, mergers and acquisitions, new product
discoveries, changes in control of management, changes in auditors, and
bankruptcy or receivership. 55 One area that is of particular concern to the SEC is
one-on-one discussions between analysts and issuers about earnings estimates. 156
The SEC has made it clear that a violation of Regulation FD will not create
new liability under § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5.'57 Thus, a violation of Regulation FD
alone does not create a private right of action. In fact, the SEC has stated that an
issuer must have "acted recklessly or intentionally in making selective disclosure.
What this means is that [the SEC is] not going to second-guess close calls
146. J. Scott Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: The S.E.C. Attacks Selective
Disclosure, but Provides Little Stability for Analysts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
147. LAURA S. UNGER, SEC, SPECIAL STUDY: REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE REvISrTED
(2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
148. Id.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2003).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 243.100(a)(1).
152. Id. § 243.100(a)(2).
153. See supra note 85-96 and accompanying text.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
155. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, 17 CFR §243 (2003).
156. Id.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102.
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regarding the materiality of a potential disclosure."' 58 Therefore, any punishment
for a violation of Regulation FD will likely arise only in the most egregious cases
and will result in only an administrative penalty.
Regulation FD has generated considerable debate concerning its effectiveness.
Many analysts and institutional investors believe that the regulation will have a
"chilling effect" on the amount of information that issuers will be willing to
disclose. 159 Even if the quantity of information does not change, many analysts fear
that quality of information will decrease. 16 One analyst has stated that "companies
are stating too few facts in too many words, making their press releases overly
long. Clearly an example of information overload, the press releases have produced
a watershed of useless information."' 161 In a survey by the Securities Industry
Association ("SIA"), seventy-two percent of analysts believe that information from
issuers is lower in quality than pre-regulation FD information. 1
62
While this may have been the atmosphere in the months or years following
passage of the regulation, there is more recent research suggesting the information
available now is better than pre-regulation information. 6 One study reveals that
price discovery has actually improved while price volatility has decreased. 164 Since
Regulation FD is a relatively new regulation, more time is needed to determine its
actual level of effectiveness, but recent studies show that Regulation FD is having a
positive effect on the information available to the market.
Regardless of the impact of Regulation FD on the quantity and quality of
information available to investors, the regulation will have little effect on the
incentives for analysts to accurately value securities. This is true for several
reasons. First, Regulation FD is not aimed directly at analysts but instead at issuers
of information.'65 In addition it creates no private right of action for a violation.' 66
Therefore, nothing in the regulation addresses analyst behavior. Perhaps most
importantly, the regulation fails to address analyst compensation issues and the
close relationship between analysts and investment banking business. By failing to
address these issues, Regulation FD does nothing to address the lack of analysts'
incentive to properly value securities. Nor does it address the void in incentives that
would be created by eliminating conflicts of interest. Because of these failures,
Regulation FD will not have a tremendous impact in improving the accuracy of
sell-side analyst recommendations.
158. Richard H. Walker, Speech Before the Compliance & Legal Division of the
Securities Industry Association (Nov. 1, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/newsl
speech/spch4l5.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
159. Id.
160. UNGER, supra note 147, at § I.B.2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1066-67.
164.Id.
165. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2003).




The SEC adopted Regulation AC on April 14, 2003.167 Regulation AC states
that when a broker, dealer, or covered person168 furnishes research "prepared by a
research analyst to a 'person in the United States,"' the research must include two
different statements by the research analyst. 69 In the first statement, the analyst
must certify that the research being provided truly reflects the analyst's opinion.'
70
Second, the analyst must disclose to what degree, if any, her compensation is
directly or indirectly dependent on a specific recommendation tied to investment
business. 171 If part of the analyst's compensation is based on the specific
recommendation, the analyst must disclose the source and amount of that income
as well as the fact that the recommendation could be biased by the analyst's
compensation. 7 2 Again, it is important to note that this regulation is targeted at
brokers and dealers, not at the analysts themselves. Also, like Reulation FD,
Regulation AC does not create a private right of action under § 10(b).'
Regulation AC is so recent that it is difficult to predict how effective it will be,
but there are indications that the regulation will not have a tremendous impact on
analyst behavior. The goal of Regulation AC is to "promote the integrity of
research reports and investor confidence in the recommendations contained in those
reports." 7 While Regulation AC may cause some analysts to have second
thoughts about issuing reports that do not truly reflect their opinions, 175 some in the
SEC believe that this is merely a temporary fix to a deep and pervasive problem.
For example, SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid has taken the position that
"[Regulation AC] is little more than a 'patch' on a system that is 'badly broken'
and that the SEC needs to go further and undertake comprehensive rule making in
this area."' 176 Commissioner Goldschmid also warns that certification "is not a seal
of approval" and that investors would still benefit from doing their own analysis. 177
In addition to the concerns of Commissioner Goldschmid, Regulation AC also
fails to address the issue of analyst incentives. Much like Regulation FD,
Regulation AC is not aimed directly at analysts, but instead targets broker-
dealers. 7 8 It also lacks a private right of action. 79 Thus, there is no motivation for
analysts to change their behavior. More importantly, Regulation AC still allows for,
167. Final Rule: Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8193,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47384, 17 CFR § 242.500-242.505 (2003).
168. "Covered Persons" is defined as an associated person of that broker or dealer, with
some exceptions. 17 C.F.R. § 242.500.
169. Id. § 242.501(a).
170. Id. § 242.501(a)(1).
171. Id. § 242.501(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
172. Id. § 242.501(a)(2)(ii)(A), (B).
173. Fisch & Sale, supra note I, at 1069.
174. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8119, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-46301, 17 CFR § 242.500-242.505 (2003).
175. Deborah Solomon, SEC Requires Analysts Certify Their Research, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2003, at A.2.
176. Lynn Hume, Regulation: SEC Narrows Scope of Final Rule Requiring Analysts to
Certify Views, BOND BUYER, Feb. 7, 2003, at 5.
177. Solomon, supra note 175.
178. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a).
179. Fisch & Sale, supra note 1, at 1069.
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and even anticipates, analyst recommendations based to some degree on their
involvement with investment banking business.' The regulation merely requires
disclosure of the degree to which the analyst's compensation is based on the
analyst's involvement with certain investment banking business. 81 This leaves the
analyst free to continue issuing biased recommendations with the simple disclaimer
that the report may be biased in some way.
C. Self-Regulatory Organizations and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Another form of regulation applicable to market analysts comes from self-
regulatory organizations ("SRO"). Self-regulatory organizations, in this case the
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD"), are charged with setting rules and disciplining its members.1 82
The SEC must approve any rules of these organizations before they become
effective. 83 Under current federal regulation, almost all broker-dealers working in
the United States must be members of the NASD and are therefore subject to the
NASD regulations. 184 Both the NYSE and the NASD first adopted rules in the
spring of 2002 to govern analyst conflicts of interest. However, since the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the fall of 2002, these rules have undergone
significant change. Since these two sets of rules are meant to reach the same result,
they will be discussed together.185
In May 2002, the SEC approved rule changes filed by the NYSE and the
NASD that dealt with analyst conflicts of interest.' 86 The primary objective of these
rules was to negate the influence that investment banking exerted on analyst
recommendations. 87 These regulations prohibited analysts from promising positive
ratings in exchange for investment banking business.' 88 The rules also dealt with
problems associated with analyst compensation by preventing analysts'
compensation from being tied to any particular investment deal.189 These
regulations also attempted to make analyst conflicts more public by requiring
disclosure of all potential conflicts of interest. 19° Along these same lines, these
rules required the firms to disclose a record of all ratings in order to help
individuals track how the investment firm rated stocks and to test whether they
were overly positive. 191
In July 2002, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, calling it the
"most far-reaching reform[] of American business practices since the time of
180. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2)(ii)(A).
181. Id.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (2003).
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4.
184. Watchdogs Didn't Bark, supra note 27, at 50 (testimony of Robert R. Glauber,
Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.).
185. NASD and NYSE Rulernaking, Exchange Act Release No. 34,48252, 68 Fed.
Reg. 45,875, 45,875-76 (Aug. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov./rules/sro/34-
48252.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
186. Id. at 45,876.
187. Id.






Franklin Delano Roosevelt."'192 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was Congress's attempt to
deal with the scandal that rocked corporate America following the collapse of
major public companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and others. 193 In addition to
addressing issues such as independence on the board of directors and executive
loans, Congress also included a section dealing with analyst independence.
94
Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that "[tihe Commission, or upon
the authorization and direction of the Commission, a registered securities
association or national securities exchange, shall have adopted ... rules reasonably
designed to address conflicts of interest that can arise when securities analysts
recommend equity securities in research reports and public appearances."195 In
order to achieve this mandate, the SEC delegated responsibility to the NYSE and
the NASD.196 On July 29, 2003, the SEC approved these SRO proposals.
97
Again, since these rules are less than six-months old, it is difficult to
accurately assess or predict their effectiveness, but of all the regulations, these may
have the greatest effect on analyst incentives. Section 2711(d), which deals with
analyst compensation, is the most important section of the NASD rules regarding
the issue of analyst incentives. Section (d)(1) of this regulation states that "[n]o
member [of the NASD] may pay any bonus, salary or other form of compensation
to a research analyst that is based upon a specific investment banking services
transaction."' 198 Section (d)(2), added to comply with the demands of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, further regulates how analyst compensation should be determined. 199
This section requires a broker-dealer to establish a committee to review and
approve all analyst compensation. To prevent further conflicts of interest, no
member of the firm's investment banking business can be a member of this
committee. 2°° Among other factors, this committee is to consider the "correlation
between the research analyst's recommendations and the stock price
performance., 20 1 The effect of this is to increase the incentive to accurately
evaluate securities. If an analyst can improve his compensation, not by his
involvement in the investment banking business but by the accuracy of his
recommendations in relation to stock performance, the analyst should have greater
incentive to accurately value securities. Professor John Coffee, Jr., in testimony
before the Senate, called these regulations a "serious and commendable effort to
192. Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1283, 1284 (July 30, 2002).
193. Michael Chakarun, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, THE NAT'L PuB. ACCT., Oct.
2002, at 6.
194. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301, 402, 501, 16 Stat. 745,
775-77, 787-88, 791-93 (2002).
195. Id. § 501.
196. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking, supra note 185.
197. Press Release, NYSE, Rule 472-Amendments to Disclosure and Reporting
Requirements (Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with author),
198. NASD, Rules of Association, § 271 l(d)(1), at http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/key
word_index/tocmg.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
199. Id. § 271 l(d)(2).
200. Id.
201. Id § 271 l(d)(2)(B).
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police the conflicts of interest that exist within broker-dealer firms that both
underwrite securities and provide securities research and recommendations.
' 20 2
While the SRO rules will have a positive impact on analyst incentives, they
still have several shortfalls. For example, it is argued that the regulations will be
difficult to police.2 °3 Because compensation of analysts is such a uniquely personal
determination, it may be difficult to determine the true motives behind changes in
analysts' compensation. In addition, not all coercion comes through memos or
e-mails to the analyst. Coercive pressure can come in far subtler forms, such as
changes in voice inflection and a raised eyebrow during conversations. 2°4 While
overt pressure can be policed, many subtler forms of coercion, in all likelihood,
cannot.
205
In addition to this policing problem, another problem surfaces. While an
analyst's compensation may not be based on a specific investment banking deal, an
analyst may still receive compensation based on the overall profitability of the
entire broker-dealer, the majority of whose income is from investment banking
business. In fact, § 2711(h)(2) even anticipates that research analysts'
compensation will still be based to some degree on investment banking business.20 6
This section requires disclosure of any compensation of the analyst that is based in
part on investment banking revenue. 20 7 Because of the failure of the regulation to
prevent investment banking business from impacting analyst compensation,
analysts still have an overall incentive to boost the overall profitability of the firm,
which includes increasing investment banking.
D. The Global Settlement
The Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts of Interest was an
enforcement action brought by the SEC, in conjunction with the NASD, NYSE,
New York Attorney General, and other state agencies, against ten of the largest
broker-dealer firms in the country.20 8 While the Global Settlement is not a
regulation, it will still play an important role in policing analyst behavior. In
addition to the monetary sanctions discussed above, 09 the Global Settlement also
required several procedural changes with the intention of further insulating
analysts' recommendations from the pressure and influence of investment
banking.
210
First, the Global Settlement requires investment firms to sever ties between the
investment banking side and the research side. 21' The result is to mandate the
"Chinese Wall," at least for these ten companies, where it was not previously
202. John C. Coffee, Jr., Auditors and Analysts: An Analysis of the Evidence and
Reform Proposals in Light of the Enron Experience, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at 160-61.
203. Id. at 162.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See NASD, supra note 198, § 271 l(h)(2).
207. Id.
208. SEC Press Release, supra note 100.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
210. Statement Regarding Global Settlement, supra note 98.
211. SEC Press Release, supra note 100.
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mandated. Additionally, each firm must disclose its ratings and price forecasts,
212
allowing investors to evaluate accuracy over time. Finally, one of the most
influential sections of the Global Settlement is the requirement that all broker-
dealers supply their customers with independent research for the next five years.
213
Any time that the broker-dealer gives a customer research by its own analysts, it
214
must also supply the research of independent analysts. '  This gives the customer
an opportunity to compare the possibly biased opinion of the sell-side analyst with
that of an independent analyst.
Like most other remedies discussed in this Note, the efficacy of the Global
Settlement is still uncertain. The Global Settlement could have at least two
distinctly different effects on analyst incentives. The Global Settlement may
increase incentive to properly value securities because customers now have access
to independent research. 215 This would mean that the shortcomings of sell-side
analyst reports would be readily apparent to investors. Sell-side analysts' research
will not be of any value to investors unless these analysts increase the accuracy of
their reporting to compete with independent analysts.
On the other hand, the availability of independent research to investors may
actually lessen sell-side analysts' incentive to properly value securities. Because
independent research must be given to clients regardless of the accuracy of the sell-
side research, it may lead sell-side analysts to spend less time in researching stocks
or to stop researching altogether. The cost of research may become duplicative. If
analysts are already providing customers with research, the time and financial
burden of improving sell-side research to be competitive with that of independent
research may outweigh the benefit to both the broker-dealer and the investor.
Regardless of which of these two effects the Global Settlement has on analyst
research, there are other factors that have the potential to make the Global
Settlement less effective. First, the Global Settlement only applies to ten firms, not
the entire industry. 216 This leaves some investment firms free to continue to publish
biased research. Additionally, not all the people who read the recommendations of
sell-side analysts are afforded the luxury of independent research. The Global
Settlement onl Y requires independent research to be given to customers of the
broker-dealers. This leaves a large segment of those who may read the
recommendations-that is, investors who read the recommendations that have been
made available free to the public, but who are not customers-vulnerable to biased
research of sell-side analysts.
III. SUGGESTED REGULATIONS
While the regulations discussed above are positive steps in advancing investor
security and restoring confidence in the market, they do not address all the possible
causes of negative analyst behavior. As noted, they do not adequately address the
lack of analyst incentives to properly value securities. This Note contends that the









separate analyst research from investment banking. This would be similar to what
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did with auditors and consulting; however, "the conflict
[involving analysts] might be ... even more serious because the empirical evidence
does suggest that the advice given by conflicted analysts is different from the
advice given by independent analysts.' 1
8
A separation of investment banking business from research would cause a shift
in incentive. The two greatest differences between independent analysts and sell-
side analysts are the ties to investment banking business and incentives that do not
depend on the accuracy of research. If a research department wants to continue to
function after the split from investment banking, they will have to do so by
providing accurate research. This would put them in the same position as
independent analysts, who must "work to eat."219 By separating research from
investment banking, the regulation would eliminate the conflicts of interest and
also create greater incentive to accurately rate securities.
One potential problem with this solution is that because sell-side research is
not a revenue generating activity it may simply disappear.22 ° While those that lost
millions based on inaccurate analyst recommendations may celebrate this result,
the loss of this resource may pose certain problems.22 1 For instance, many courts
and academics see analysts as serving a vital role in the market.222 The analyst is
supposed to serve the market by taking large volumes of incomprehensible
information from issuers and compiling it into a more understandable report.223 The
fear is that losing sell-side analysts will cause a decrease in market efficiency.
224
This Note does not challenge the validity of the market efficiency theory,
although academics are beginning to do just that.225 However, this Note does
challenge the role that sell-side analysts play in that system. Analysts are only
valuable to the extent that their recommendations are based qualitatively on the
information coming from the company. 226 If analysts are not basing their
recommendations on this information in a constructive way, then they add nothing
to market efficiency and should not receive special treatment.227 Recent research
has revealed that analysts are not basing their recommendations on the available
information. 228 However, even if sell-side analysts are basing their reports on
218. Coffee, Jr., supra note 202, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND LEGAL
IMPUCATIONS, supra note 16, at 161. Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
prohibits any public accounting firm that is going to perform an audit for any securities
issuer from also performing other certain consulting duties such as bookkeeping, actuarial
services, investment advising, or legal services. § 201,116 Stat. at 771.
219. See supra text accompanying note 144.
220. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 202, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at 161.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 162.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Langevoort, supra note 18, at 140-43.
226. See id. at 152.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Reassessing the Returns of Analyst Stock
Recommendations, FIN. ANALYST J., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 88, 94; Bradford Cornell, Is the
Response of Analysts to Information Consistent with Fundamental Valuation? The Case of
Intel, FIN. MGMT., Spring 2001, at 113, 133-34; Fisher & Statman, supra note 75, at 72.
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available information, research suggests that sell-side analysts whose interests are
not entirely aligned with investors cannot credibly convey information to those
investors. 229
In 2000 and 2001, sell-side analysts' "buy" ratings underperformed the market
by more than seven percent. 230 Perhaps more telling, however, is the fact that "sell"
ratings outperformed the market by approximately thirteen percent. 23 1 This means
that investors would have seen better gains by doing exactly the opposite of what
sell-side analysts recommended. An interesting study by Professor Bradford
Cornell sheds light on why this may have been the case. 232 Professor Cornell took a
case study approach to a press release issued by Intel on September 21, 2000.233
Prior to the issuance of this press release, almost all of the twenty-eight analysts
then following the stock strongly recommended purchase of Intel's securities; Intel
was trading at around seventy-four dollars per share at this time. 3 Following the
press release of September 21, however, the stock dropped approximately thirty
percent to around forty dollars per share.235 As the stock price fell, many analysts
downgraded the stock, some even by multiple levels. 236 According to Professor
Cornell, the information in the press release was not sufficient to cause such a
sharp decline.237 Professor Cornell's study revealed that when Intel was trading at
seventy-four dollars per share it was overvalued; however, Intel was one of the
most highly recommended stocks on the market. 238 Following the drop in price, the
stock was trading at a price that more accurately reflected its true value; yet,
analysts had significantly downgraded the stock.239 Professor Cornell believes that
when the analysts failed to "focus on fundamental value, and by not presenting
explicit.., valuation models, analysts short change[d] investors." 240
Instead of focusing on important price predictors such as fundamental value
and valuation models, analysts appear to have allowed their recommendations to
follow the market. 241 If the stock price rose, analysts recommended the stock; if the
stock price dropped, so did the recommendations of analysts. 242 This created a
cycle. As stock prices rose, so did analyst recommendations, which in turn
increased investor confidence about the stock, causing prices to rise higher.
243
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of the stock.").
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However, when the price dropped, the opposite occurred, driving prices further
down.244 This exacerbated price volatility by creating drastic swings between highs
and lows.
245
Even when sell-side analysts base their recommendations on information
available from the company, it is doubtful that they can credibly relay that
information to investors. A recent study reveals that when there is any investor
uncertainty about incentives of analysts, full revelation of information is
impossible. 246 This study argues that if individuals believe that analyst incentives
are misaligned with their own incentives, a responsive stock price is impossible.
247
This means that where analyst incentives differ from those of investors, the reports
of the analysts are discounted even if completely accurate. 248 Dissimilar incentives
lead investors to "strategic 'filtering' of information contained in the reports to
correct for bias." 249 If analysts cannot accurately convey information to investors
without a large degree of skepticism, then sell-side analyst reports add little to the
efficiency of the market. Requiring the separation of research and investment
banking would work to more closely align analyst incentives to those of investors,
thereby making information easier to effectively disseminate.
Analysts play an important role in the market by collecting information and
then relaying that information in a clear and reliable manner to investors.250 It is for
this reason that many argue against the separation of research and investment
banking business. 2 51 However, the research discussed here suggests that analysts
were not relying on the available information in formulating their opinions.
252
Additionally, even if analysts desired to accurately convey information to investors,
their interests are not aligned with investors, causing high levels of skepticism. 253
By separating the investment banking side from the research side, regulation would
create greater incentives to accurately report information and align analysts' and
investors' incentives so that those reports can be credibly relayed to investors.
CONCLUSION
The collapse of Enron and the resultant revelation of sell-side analyst
misconduct revealed a critical gap in the system of analyst regulation. The
difference between the way that sell-side analysts and independent analysts treated
Enron suggests that something in the structure of sell-side research created less
accurate research. Many reasons for this difference have been suggested including
lack of deterrence and conflicts of interest. However, these reasons do not fully
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Morgan & Stockton, supra note 229, at 184.
247. Id. The researchers state that a stock price is responsive if "all of the information
available to an analyst is reflected in the stock price, then equilibrium stock prices will
reflect this information and be continuous and strictly increasing over this interval of
values." Id. at 188.
248. See id. at 199.
249. Id.
250. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 202, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND LEGAL
IMPUCATIONS, supra note 16, at 162.
251. Id. at 161-62.
252. Cornell, supra note 228.
253. See Morgan & Stockton, supra note 229, at 199.
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explain why sell-side research was less accurate than independent research. Sell-
side analysts, unlike independent analysts, lack incentive to properly value
securities. Independent analysts must rely on the accuracy of their research to
generate revenue; sell-side analysts can rely on investment banking business to
generate profits, and analysis of securities is simply a tool with which more
investment banking business can be generated.
The regulations promulgated since the scandal involving analysts came to light
have made positive strides towards preventing future analyst indiscretion.
However, without addressing the issue of analysts' lack of incentive, the regulation
is incomplete. While sell-side research over the past year has been more bearish,
this is more a result of a struggling market and extreme media and litigation
pressure arising from past indiscretion.254 To protect investors in the future and
prevent future analyst misbehavior, more robust measures should be taken. The
best way to cleanse the taint of investment banking business from analyst ratings,
while at the same time giving analysts an incentive to properly value securities, is a
complete separation of investment banking business from research. This would
place sell-side analysts on the same footing as independent analysts and force sell-
side analysts to "work to eat."
254. Cheryl Winokur Munk & Lynn Cowan, Investors See Flaws in Analysts' Work,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002, at B3A (stating that "it is a lot easier to be negative when stocks
are downtrodden-and the real test will be when a bull market returns"). While sell ratings
have increased to around nine percent, many institutional investors still feel that "the quality
of the analysis still tends to be superficial." Id.
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